Ask a Scientist: New Plutonium Pits for Nuclear Weapons Are Not Wanted


America is planning a $1.7 trillion overhaul of its complete nuclear arsenal, designing new warheads and investing in new bombers, missiles, and submarines to hold them. The brand new warheads, in flip, are driving demand for brand new plutonium “pits”—the bomb cores that start the chain response in each US thermonuclear weapon.

Based on a brand new report by Dylan Spaulding, senior scientist on the Union of Involved Scientists and an skilled on nuclear supplies, this plan isn’t solely costly and technically pointless, but additionally hazardous and politically destabilizing. We requested him to dig into the small print.


AAS: Why are new plutonium pits pointless?

DYLAN SPAULDING: Probably the most often cited causes for resuming pit manufacturing is that our current weapons are growing old. That’s true, however the plutonium inside them is nowhere close to the top of its life, nor does it seem to degrade as dramatically as some concern, in accordance with the accessible science. As well as, most weapons within the US nuclear stockpile have undergone refurbishment comparatively lately, changing parts that do age, to make sure their ongoing reliability.  

That stated, the brand new pits being proposed aren’t even supposed to refresh the nuclear weapons we have already got. As an alternative, they’re anticipated to enter new nuclear warheads—the primary newly designed and constructed nuclear weapons that america will introduce for the reason that finish of the Chilly Conflict. What’s extra, america has 1000’s of pits sitting in storage from weapons which were retired from the nuclear arsenal, and at the very least a few of these must be appropriate for reuse.

If america have been to proceed its follow of refurbishment moderately than constructing new warheads or, higher but, work in the direction of lowering the dimensions of its arsenal, there can be no rationale in any respect for making new plutonium pits.

AAS: What are the dangers or impacts of this plan?

DYLAN SPAULDING: Previous plutonium pit manufacturing left behind a legacy of irreversible contamination at Hanford Nuclear Web site in Washington and Rocky Flats in Colorado. A lot has been realized about how one can work with plutonium extra safely, however this work at all times carries dangers, notably to staff within the occasion of accidents. The plutonium facility on the Los Alamos Nationwide Laboratory in New Mexico was shut down for 3 years due to security violations, and minor accidents proceed to happen repeatedly there, together with small fires, flooding inside gloveboxes, and publicity of staff to plutonium.

Communities close to the 2 proposed manufacturing websites (Los Alamos and the Savannah River Web site in South Carolina) are justifiably nervous about their potential publicity within the occasion of an accident and on account of contamination from decades-old waste that isn’t but remediated.

So far as new pit manufacturing goes, the Division of Power is attempting to hurry this program ahead to fulfill an arbitrary and pointless deadline imposed by Congress. The processes to manufacture new pits are inherently harmful, utilizing harmful supplies, and the workforce that will likely be accountable for finishing up pit manufacturing lacks expertise and will likely be counting on new tools and protocols. Whenever you add time stress, that’s a really harmful mixture.

AAS: The manufacturing course of creates radioactive waste. What will likely be achieved with it?

DYLAN SPAULDING: America solely has one place to get rid of its radioactive waste and that’s the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southern New Mexico. A lot of the waste from plutonium pit manufacturing will likely be sealed in drums and interred in tunnels deep underground there. That facility confronted a multi-year shutdown on account of two accidents in 2014, and it’s not clear that it’ll have the required capability, nor that the state will agree to increase its license indefinitely. As its identify suggests, it was meant to be a pilot mission, not the nation’s solely long-term waste storage website. Proper now, there isn’t any alternative however to depend on it, which creates a type of Achilles’ heel for all the US nuclear weapons manufacturing program. The nationwide labs are starting to create an entire new waste stream that they could not be capable to handle.

AAS: You say the plan would really lower nationwide safety—in what manner?

DYLAN SPAULDING: One of many newly proposed warheads, known as the W87-1, is meant to go on a brand new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) known as Sentinel. These silo-based missiles are on hair-trigger alert, which means they are often launched at a second’s discover upon warning of any incoming risk. Certainly, if they’re focused, they should be launched to keep away from being destroyed as a result of their positions are well-known. The US president has the only authority to order such a launch and has solely about 10 minutes to determine whether or not to take action if a possible assault is detected. This dangers beginning a nuclear battle by mistake.

If this nation’s ICBMs have been attacked, a whole bunch of tens of millions of individuals in america may very well be in danger from the next fallout, as proven by analysis carried out at Princeton. Quite than perpetuating this unstable and harmful established order, america may merely determine to retire its ICBMs and keep away from the pricey refurbishment of their silos and command construction and the constructing of recent warheads.  

Even with out its land-based missiles, america has safe choices for nuclear retaliation. US submarines at sea cumulatively carry roughly 5,000 instances the damaging drive of the Hiroshima bomb. Submarines and bombers additionally enable extra choice time earlier than launching an assault, bombers might be recalled, and submarines will not be targetable in the way in which land-based missile silos are—which means they don’t enhance the danger of a mistaken launch. On condition that, it’s laborious to fathom why US strategists really feel they need to keep land-based missiles at a value of nicely over $200 billion simply to supply them.

AAS: What ought to america be doing as a substitute to enhance security and safety?

DYLAN SPAULDING: At UCS, we are saying introducing new weapons and new supply techniques (new bombers, ICBMs, and nuclear-capable submarines) is in the end destabilizing and encourages the identical type of Chilly Conflict considering that leads potential adversaries to reply in type in an unwinnable arms race.

It was President Reagan and Russian President Gorbachev who stated, “A nuclear battle can’t be gained and must not ever be fought.” Neither can an arms race. The Chilly Conflict demonstrated that extra weapons don’t create extra safety. As an alternative, they heighten threat and discourage arms management agreements and nonproliferation efforts in areas the place international locations could want to purchase their very own nuclear weapons.

A greater strategy can be for america to train restraint and work in the direction of additional arms reductions moderately than doubling down on its dependency on the nuclear arsenal for perceived safety. Not solely may this keep away from the higher a part of a multi-trillion-dollar modernization program, however it could reassure the world that america has realized the lesson from the Chilly Conflict that such competitors “can’t be gained.”

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